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Introduction 
Overcoming regional economic divides has been a major aspect of economic policies 
within Europe since the Second World War. By the beginning of the 1960s ‘regional 
policy’ had become a distinct area of state intervention in several Western European 
countries, including Britain, France, Germany and the Netherlands (Artobolevskiy, 
1997, pp. 32-36). Considerable resources have been channelled into policies to 
promote regional development. It might suffice to think that the European Union 
provided some 149.9 billion Euros to finance regional development projects in the 
1958-1998 period, amounting to an estimated 63.9% of all activities in the Union 
(Vanhove, 1999, p. 460).
2 After 50 years of such efforts regional economic divides 
still persist. Although this persistence cannot be interpreted as an outright failure, it 
indicates the limited effectiveness of such policies.  
 
This paper aims to enhance our understanding of the factors hampering the 
effectiveness of regional policies, focussing on the specific case of financial subsidies 
to small and medium-sized firms (henceforth SMEs) in Italy, from 1971-1991. A 
common criticism of the Italian regional policy is that its financial subsidies enabled 
                                                 
1 Work in progress, not to be quoted without permission of the author. 
2 The figures include low interest rate loans extended by the European Investment Bank and grants by 
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Southern entrepreneurs to maximise their profits by reaping benefits from institutions 
rather than from the market (Trigiglia, 1992, pp. 93-94). This paper tests this criticism 
for financial subsidies to SMEs in the South and in the more prosperous North-East, 
where smaller subsidies were available as part of the national industrial policy. It 
argues that although Southern entrepreneurs did benefit from institutions, the rationale 
behind their behaviour was the avoidance of risk rather than the maximising of 
profits. 
 
This paper is structured in five sections. The first illustrates the system of subsidies 
available to SMEs in the South and compares them to subsidies available in the rest of 
the country. The second presents the samples of firms on which the analysis is based. 
As a first assessment of the comparative importance of subsidies, section III discusses 
the capital structure of firms in the two samples. Section IV analyses the effectiveness 
of companies in promoting the growth of recipient firms and section V discusses the 
implications of the findings. 
 
I Regional and national financial subsidies for small firms, 1970s - 1990s          
 
Subsidised medium-term loans were available to small and medium-sized firms
3 
throughout Italy from the early 1950s, via the network of the newly-established 
Special Credit Institutions (SCIs) - the Regional Medium-Term Credit Institutions 
(RMTCIs) and the Departments of Industrial Credit (DICs),
4 and their refinancing 
                                                 
3 In the 1950s small and medium-sized firms were defined as those employing no more than 500 
workers and having net assets below 1.5 bn lire. For Southern firms the upper limit on assets was twice 
as much, 3 bn lire. 
4 From the Bank Reform Law of 1936 until the early 1990s, when Italy conformed to the second EU 
Banking Directive, the banking system was specialised in market terms, meaning that banks could 
collect and lend money on the short-term market only and SCIs could collect and lend money on the D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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institution, the Mediocredito Centrale (MCC).  RMTCIs were banks operating on the 
medium-term credit
5 market and specialised in lending to SMEs. The reason for their 
specialisation lay in the fact that the Bank of Italy (BoI) and the Association of 
Industrialists (Confindustria) felt that smaller industrial concerns were disadvantaged 
in accessing finance and at the same time important for the country's economy (Asso 
and Raitano, 1999). The provision of financial subsidies (soft loans and grants) to 
Southern SMEs was part of the much wider framework of the regional policy 
managed by the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno (Cassa) established in 1950. Political and 
economic considerations led to the implementation of the so-called ‘Extraordinary 
intervention for the South’ supported by various parties, the brains trust Svimez, the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the government 
(D’Antone, 1997; Weiss, 1984). 
 
Table1 below shows the main guidelines for the allocation of soft loans and grants, 
the main financial subsidies for Southern firms, at the beginning of the period under 
analysis. 
 
Table 1 around here 
 
                                                                                                                                            
medium-term market only. The two markets are closely connected: banks being among the establishing 
partners of the SCIs, as establishing SCIs represented the path to access the medium-term credit 
market, and could finance them by purchasing their bonds. The banking system was also fragmented 
geographically, as banks and SCIs could operate on a smaller or wider territory according to the size of 
their deposits. 
5 Until the end of the 1940s, the Bank of Italy (BoI) defined short-term loans as those repayable within 
one year, medium-term from one year to five years and long-term above five years. In 1952, with the 
establishment of the MCC, the definitions were changed: short-term credit up to one year, medium-
term credit from one year up to ten years, except in Southern Italy (up to 15 years).  Short-term finance 
aimed to provide working capital and medium-term finance provided capital for investment (Pontolillo, 
1971).   D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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Table 1 shows the varying percentage of subsidies to which Southern firms were 
entitled on the basis of their size in terms of fixed assets. From 1971 the Cassa was 
operating according to policy guidelines established every five years by the 
Interministerial Committee for Economic Policy (Comitato interministeriale per la 
politica economica). The guidelines passed in 1971 intended to encourage investment 
in depopulated areas, rather than in the ‘nuclei and areas of industrial growth’ as it 
had been from 1957 to 1970. It appeared that the South was experiencing internal 
migration from the rural hinterland to industrial agglomerations within the South, in 
addition to migration towards the industrial cities of the North and international 
migration (Ronzani, 1980). 
  
Financial subsidies to large firms followed a procedure called ‘contrattazione 
programmata’  (planned bargaining procedures), which ensured consultations between 
large firms planning investment and a restricted group of Ministries (Budget and 
Economic Planning, Treasury, Labour and Industry). The aim of this procedure was to 
ensure that investment projects were compatible with the directives of the national 
economic planning to limit new investment in areas suffering from congestion and 
labour shortages; moreover, the aim of the consultations was to make firms aware of 
the public investment so that they could be exploited to the fullest and conversely to 
adjust public investment to large companies’ needs (Annesi, 1973). 
 
Table 1 above displays the criteria to allocate soft loans and grants to Southern firms 
under the main schemes. However, since the beginning of the 1950s a number of 
regional and national subsidy schemes had been introduced.  Their proliferation, 
leading to a ‘jungle of incentives’, in which the same firm could benefit from various D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\OLK63\SpadavecchiaPaper.doc29/08/2006 
5
schemes, has been regarded as a consequence of the lack of a coherent industrial 
policy. The absence of an all-embracing approach left room for pressure from 
economic interest groups, which often led to the formulation of schemes addressing 
specific or sectoral problems (Barca and Manghetti, 1976). 
 
The awareness of the need to simplify the loan system led to the harmonisation of 
regional and national schemes in 1976-77. By that time, subsidised credit was 
regarded as particularly important, as the Bank of Italy’s tight monetary policy had 
made borrowing more expensive (Vassalli and Visentini, 1978). For subsidised credit, 
Italy was subdivided into 4 areas, 1) South; 2) underdeveloped areas in the Centre; 3) 
underdeveloped areas in the North; 4) the Centre and North. The details for each 
region are given in table 2.  
 
Table 2 around here 
 
A new soft loan scheme was introduced in the following year. This was considered 
particularly important as it placed emphasis on the restructuring of existing plants, 
rather than on the establishment of new ones (Pent Formengo, 1986).  
 
Table 3 around here 
 
In addition the Cassa amended its grant scheme in 1976. As table 3 demonstrates, 
after 1979 large investments were entitled to larger grants than originally envisaged. 
 




The Cassa had been established in 1950 as a temporary institution supposed to last 
until 1980, but between 1980 and 1986, 11 ministerial decrees were passed to prolong 
its activities, sometime for such a short period of time as a year or even six or three 
months. All political parties agreed to keep an additional flow of resources going to 
the South, but there were disagreement concerning the institutional framework for the 
management of these funds (Cafiero and Marciani, 1991) 
 
The uncertainty of the 1980-1986 period was ended by law 64/1986, which refinanced 
and reorganised the extraordinary intervention for the South until 1993. The system of 
soft loans and grants created in 1986 is given in table 5. 
 
Table 5 around here  
 
As 1993 approached, attempts to prolong funding failed because of domestic and 
external pressures. The Parliamentary debate coincided with growing resentment in 
the North about the levels of public expenditure in the South, and its harmful effects 
on Northern employment. Furthermore, critics pointed out that few tangible results 
had been achieved in 40 years of the Southern policies, which had been a drain on the 
economy of the North. In addition, there was growing antipathy towards the role of 
the public administration in the Italian economy and to the institutional structure 
operating the Mezzogiorno policy. These tensions were reflected in calls for a 
referendum on the Southern policy and in the considerable success of the Northern 
separatists. Apart from domestic pressures, the European Commission also influenced 
the course of events, by refusing to approve the 1992 bill to refinance the Agency. D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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Taking into account the Commission’s opposition, in December 1992 the Italian 
Parliament decided to abolish the ‘Extraordinary intervention’ and its institutions, 
with the Southern policy to be replaced by a national programme of assistance for 
depressed areas (Yuill et al., 1989).  
 
II  The dataset 
 
The impact of state subsidies on recipient firms is analysed using two case studies – 
the industrial districts (henceforth IDs) of Barletta located in the South and San 
Mauro Pascoli located in the North-East, the ‘classic’ area of IDs (see map in 
Appendix A). The two IDs specialise in the production of footwear and clothing and 
were chosen from a survey that identified 99 IDs across the whole country at the end 
of the 1980s (Garavini et al., 1988).  
 
The analysis is performed on two relatively small samples of companies (54 overall), 
the records of which are held at the Chambers of Commerce in Forlì (for the San 
Mauro ID) and Bari (for the Barletta ID). The samples consist of limited liability and 
public share companies alone, as these are the only ones legally obliged to deposit 
their balance sheets at the local Chamber of Commerce. The analysis presented is 
based on raw balance sheets, reclassified according to financial criteria. Therefore, 
this dataset allows the isolation of subsidies from other components of liabilities, e.g. 
soft loans from long-term borrowed funds and grants from reserves. This was not 
possible in previous works, which were based on the reclassified balance sheets made 
available by the institutions. 
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At various points in time, the first sample includes 32 manufacturing companies 
located in Barletta and the second sample includes 21 manufacturing companies 
located in San Mauro. The two samples provide 681 observations – annual balance 
sheets – over time, 460 for Southern companies and 221 for the North-Eastern 
samples. The smaller number of companies in the North-Eastern sample is related to 
the smaller size of the manufacturing sector in the SMP ID. The smaller number of 
annual observations was also determined by the fact that these companies did not 
have public status or were not trading during the whole 1971-91 period; most were 
established as public companies or went public in the 1980s in the San Mauro sample, 
whereas most companies in the Barletta sample did so in the second half of the 1970s.  
More information about companies in the samples is provided in Appendix B. 
 
The initial intention was to collect a random sample of at least 30 companies for each 
ID, in the sectors of specialisation. If 30 such companies could not be found, the 
samples would have been expanded to include companies in other manufacturing 
sectors (henceforth man1).
6 However, the scarcity of data was such that the two 
samples were compiled by collecting all available records of public companies in the 
manufacturing sectors mentioned, with records starting before 1984 in the case of 
Barletta, and before 1988 for San Mauro, to provide a sufficiently long period of 
analysis.
7 Table 6 compares the number of companies in the two samples with the 
number of companies in the two IDs; it also presents information on the size of public 
companies.  
                                                 
6 Including food processing, wood, furniture, paper, publishing, photography and rubber. Sectors such 
as metal and mineral processing, oil refining and construction have not been included. 
7 The different closing dates for the collection of data are due to the availability of records. Having 
collected records of 32 companies in the Barletta ID, it seemed unnecessary to collect records starting 
after 1984, as these would offer only seven years of analysis. The smaller number of records available 




Table 6 around here 
 
A precise comparison based on the number of employees is not feasible, as companies 
in the sample give only occasional information about their workforce. From census 
data, it emerges that both IDs contain a large number of companies, most of which are 
very small, and that the average size of public companies is higher than the average 
company size in the sectors of specialisation. Thus, companies in the samples should 
also capture a larger portion of the ID workforce than their sheer number suggests.  
 
The inclusion of public companies alone introduces some biases into the sample, 
particularly as regards capital structure. Their larger size and their legal status might 
give them easier access to market capital and access to a wider range of types of 
finance, such as bonds, which can only be issued by public companies. Thus, market 
finance is likely to be higher for the sample companies than for small and medium-
sized companies as a whole in the two IDs. This bias can be magnified by the 
computation of weighted averages, rather than a simple average. Nevertheless, 
weighted averages have been preferred in the analysis of the capital structure (tables 8 
and 9) as the purpose of the capital structure analysis is to offer a broader picture of 
the IDs. It thus seemed correct to allocate greater weight to the sources of finance of 
larger companies than, for instance, to those of a small start-up company.  
 
The samples contain a further bias. Far more records in the Southern sample date back 
to the 1970s than in the North-Eastern counterpart. Considering that the 1980s saw 
more stable economic growth than the 1970s, this might affect the differences D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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emerging from the comparison of the two samples. This bias does not affect the 
comparison of the capital structure and performance of the two samples in tables 8 
and 9, as in those tables the overall period of analysis is broken into sub-periods, e.g. 
1971-75, 1976-80. Table 7 below shows the size, in terms of net capital stock and the 
turnover of the companies in the two samples. 
 
Table 7 around here 
 
Despite the larger dimension of the Southern companies in terms of fixed net capital, 
they are considerably smaller in terms of turnover. The largest Southern company, in 
terms of assets, also determines the upper limit of turnover. Without this company, the 
upper limit of turnover for Southern companies would be 8.5bn lire. The lower limit 
of turnover in the San Mauro sample derives from one company that traded for four 
years, after which it went bankrupt. Excluding this company, the lower limit would be 
236m lire. 
 
III Capital structure 
 
This section assesses the relative importance of subsidies as a source of finance of the 
companies in the two samples. The analysis covers the 1971-91 period. It has been 
broken into sub-periods in the attempt to identify possible changes in the capital 
structure of these companies. Moreover, as not all 54 companies in the two samples 
traded or remained public from 1971 to 1991, this choice allows a clear identification 
of the number of company records available in each sub-period. 
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The components of liabilities have been calculated as a weighted average. The share 
in total liability of each source of finance (short-term bank loans, commercial debts, 
long-term borrowed capital, equity, loans and contributions by partners, paid-up 
capital) has been computed for each district in each sub-period using the following 
formula (Edwards and Fisher, 1994): 
t=1975     t=1975     
e.g. 1971-75:    Σ i
J 
t    /   Σ It
       t=1971     t= 1971 
                                       n  
Where i
J 
t denotes the amount of finance of type j in year t, It= Σ i
J 
t
                                                                                                    J=1 
(there are n different types of finance). 
 
Table 8 displays the greater reliance of companies in the Barletta sample on subsidies. 
Not only do subsidised loans represent a higher percentage of total liabilities, but also 
the implicit subsidy
8 within soft loans was much higher for Southern firms. This 
reflects the fact that the differential between the medium-term non-subsidised interest 
rate and the average subsidised interest rate was higher in the South than in the Centre 
and North, and the redemption period was longer. The variation in the implicit 
subsidy within each sample and across sub-periods is not affected by the redemption 
period, which remained constant throughout the whole period of analysis, but rather 
reflects the fluctuations in the differential between non-subsidised and average 
subsidised interest rates in the South and in the Centre and North. 
                                                 
8The implicit subsidy in a subsidised loan has been calculated using the following formula  
 





N] }  
 
where: L = loan; rM = non-subsidised long-term interest rate; rA = subsidised interest rate; N =length of 




Southern firms display higher shares of long-term debts, mostly consisting of 
subsidised loans, whereas non-subsidised long-term credit is a more important source 
of finance for companies in the North-Eastern sample. Therefore, it seems clear that 
companies in the Southern sample reach shares of long-term capital comparable to the 
North-Eastern sample only with the substantial help of subsidies, consistent with 
regional policy’s aim of increasing the availability of long-term capital in the South. 
Moreover, subsidies seem to have also a crowding-in effect, suggested by the higher 
value of market long-term capital (total LTBC minus subsidies in brackets) presented 
by subsidised firms in both samples.  
 
Reserves are a key element in this analysis for two reasons. First, reserves include 
grants, and secondly, they are built up with undistributed profits, hence reserves 
represent the company’s ability to self-finance. For the 1971-75 and 1976-80 periods, 
companies in the North-Eastern sample show a low weight of reserves. This is due to 
the presence of start-up companies in these periods (two in 1971-75 and two in 1976-
80). Moreover, the reserves of the largest company in each period were sharply 
decreasing while their fixed net assets were increasing, indicating that both were 
using reserves to finance investment. For the later periods, the higher percentage of 
reserves and the higher rates of return in the North-Eastern sample demonstrate a 
greater ability to self-finance by reinvesting profits, whereas Southern companies 
reached comparable percentages of reserves only with the considerable help of grants.  
 
Commercial debts represent the single largest component of companies’ liabilities. 
This is not surprising considering the long period over which companies can pay their D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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suppliers. Between 1985 and 1987 Southern firms paid their suppliers after a period 
varying from a minimum of 60 days for the food-processing sector, to 150 and 200 
days respectively in clothing/textiles and the engineering sectors. In the same years, 
firms in the same sectors in the Centre and North paid their suppliers after 62, 130 and 
190 days (Siracusano and Tresoldi, 1990). Therefore, the balance sheets of companies 
in the clothing/textile sector, which are relatively numerous in the Southern sample, 
include goods and services bought in the last five months.      
 
The rate of return on long-term capital clearly shows the lower profitability of 
Southern companies in the sample (particularly low during 1971-75, mainly due to a 
large number of start-up companies), which can be explained in both micro- and 
macroeconomic terms. Southern small firms (20-100 employees) show a slower 
turnover of inventories (for the textile and footwear sectors - 108 days in the South 
and 68 in the rest of the country) and a lower utilisation of production capacity - a 
consequence of the more limited market in the South and smaller export opportunities 
(Siracusano and Tresoldi, 1990, pp. 113-119 and pp. 125-127). Southern industry was 
less able to exploit scale economies internal and external to the firm, than firms 
located in more developed areas of the country (Rossi and Toniolo, 1995). In addition, 
Southern companies did not exploit economies of specialisation, as the Southern 
manufacturing sector relied far less on vertical specialisation (Giannola, 1990). 
Furthermore, it is possible that the lower productivity of Southern companies could 
also be due to the use of more obsolete equipment. A study of depreciation rates for 
companies within the sample reveals that in the 1980s North-Eastern companies - D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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which were then enjoying particularly high rates of return - were replacing their 
equipment more quickly than their Southern counterparts (Spadavecchia, 2003).
9
 
Comparing the rate of return of subsidised and non-subsidised companies in the two 
samples in the 1980s (when the North-Eastern sample includes a good number of 
observations), it seems clear that subsidised firms are more profitable in the Southern 
sample, whereas the opposite applies to North-Eastern firms. However, the 
observation of financial indicators offers no firm ground to make inferences about the 
effectiveness of the policy. If subsidised firms seem to enjoy no particular benefits in 
comparison with non-subsidised firms, as in the North-Eastern sample, it could be 
inferred that the policy was ineffective. In the case of better financial indicators 
displayed by subsidised Southern firms, it might be argued that the policy generated 
dependency and that firms could perform well only when subsidised. This would be 
an undesirable outcome, resulting from subsidies breaking the nexus between the 
firms’ performance and efficiency, which in turn entails the permanent capture of 
government funds and in extreme cases the bailing out of troubled firms (Calomiris 
and Himmelberg, 1995). Moreover, dividing the companies into just two groups - 
subsidised and non-subsidised - can hide some interesting differences. After all, the 
non-subsidised group includes companies that were not subsidised in the specific sub-
period but were subsidised a few years later, companies that had been subsidised in 
previous years, and companies that were never subsidised. 
 
IV  The effectiveness of subsidies for the Barletta and San Mauro samples. 
 
                                                 
9 For a more extensive discussion of the importance of subsidies as a source of finance for companies 
within Italian industrial districts see Spadavecchia (2005). D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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This section assesses the effectiveness of subsidies by analysing companies at various 
stages of their life cycle, i.e. before receiving subsidies, while being subsidised and 
after receiving subsidies, and comparing them to companies that were never 
subsidised. This methodology has been designed by Bagella and Caggese (1995), but 
it has never been applied. Their study is based on balance sheet indicators and 
qualitative information on 3,852 manufacturing firms, trading between 1989 and 
1991. However, the only information about subsidies is whether or not the company 
has been subsidised in the period, and from which scheme it benefited (Mediocredito 
Centrale, 1995). Therefore, they could only compare the profitability and risk of 
subsidised and non-subsidised companies in the country as a whole and by regions, 
but admittedly they left open another issue, namely whether subsidies had a positive 
effect on the recipient firms' ability to stay on the market, once they were no longer 
subsidised.  
 
Subsidies should increase the profitability of the recipient firms, meaning moving the 
recipient company from position (1) in the graph below, characterised by low and 
highly variable profit, to position (2), with higher and less variable profit. Subsidised 
companies should move from positions (1) to position (2) in the graph as subsidies 
increase the recipient companies’ profits and decrease the variability of profits, by 
providing an additional fixed component to their profits. However, in order to assess 
the effectiveness of subsidies it is crucial to study the position occupied by the 
company in the post-subsidy stage (Bagella and Caggese, 1995).  
 
Graph 1 around here 
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For companies in the post-subsidy stage to return to position 1 would mean that their 
profitability could be improved only by constant subsidies, which would entail a 
permanent capture of government funds, the breaking of the link between firms’ 
performance and their efficiency, and in extreme cases the bailing out of troubled 
firms. Moreover, if the profitability of a company in the post-subsidy stage goes back 
to position 1, the company will be perceived by banks as a ‘bad company’ and 
therefore will be credit rationed, whereas if it remains in position 2 or moves to the 
‘competitive firm’ position it should not experience credit rationing again (Bagella 
and Caggese, 1995). Therefore, for subsidies to be considered effective, it is crucial 
that companies not only move from position 1 to position 2 when subsidised, but also 
that companies in the post-subsidy stage at least remain in position 2, or preferably, 
move even further to the right on the graph, closer to the ideal position of 
‘competitive firm’. This should happen because as the firm is a learning organisation 
(Lamoureaux, Raff and Temin, 1999) the recipient company should learn how to 
conduct its business better while in the subsidised stage.   
 
The two small samples used in this analysis allow the assessment of the positions 
occupied by companies in the post-subsidy stage in the graph above. The samples 
have been constructed with companies’ raw records, therefore it has been possible to 
identify the subsidies and their timing, and divide accordingly the companies’ life into 
stages, i.e. before receiving subsidies, while subsidised and after receiving subsidies, 
and separate them from companies that were never subsidised. This subdivision 
reduces considerably the number of observations available for each group, and 
therefore the division of observations into sub-periods, applied in tables 8 and 9, has 
been abandoned and the observations have been aggregated for the whole 1971-91 D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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period. Due to the small size of the samples, the results of this analysis should be 
considered as indicative, nevertheless it seemed worthwhile to throw some light on a 
hitherto unexplored issue. 
 
Table 10 around here 
 
The three sub-samples - pre-subsidy, subsidised and post-subsidy - portray a 
hypothetical life cycle of companies in the two samples, from smaller and younger 
when unsubsidised to larger and older in the subsidised stage. However, while 
companies in the North-Eastern sample continue to grow, as measured by the balance 
sheet size, in the post-subsidy stage, companies in the Southern samples become 
smaller. As table 11 below shows, this is due to two factors: Southern companies in 
the post-subsidy stage were only slightly larger than the average while in the 
subsidised group, in terms of balance sheet size. In addition to this, the size of their 
balance sheets decreases considerably in the post-subsidy stage also due to the rapid 
decrease in size of the two companies that are failing while in this stage. In contrast, 
three out of the four North-Eastern companies in the post-subsidy stage were not only 
well above the average for the subsidy-stage companies, but also the size of their 
balance sheet kept increasing in the post-subsidy stage. The fourth North-Eastern 
company follows a pattern closer to that described for the Southern post-subsidy 
companies.   
 
Table 11 around here 
 D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
Files\OLK63\SpadavecchiaPaper.doc29/08/2006 
18
The three North-eastern companies that saw continued balance-sheet growth left the 
subsidised stage because they exceeded the upper limit of eligibility for subsidies (2bn 
lire). Two of these started issuing bonds and managed to secure sums far larger than 
the soft loans received by companies in the same sample at an interest rate slightly 
lower than the market one.  
 
As for explaining the reason why other companies in the sample abandoned the 
system of subsidies or never entered it, it was not possible to make inferences in 
specific cases. It is possible that these companies’ applications for soft loans were 
rejected; on the basis of unpublished sources provided by the Ministry of Industry it 
has been estimated that the percentage of rejected applications in the North-East 
varied between 10% and 20%. Moreover, according to a 1989-91 survey of 5,000 
manufacturing companies in the whole country, 35% did not apply for subsidies 
despite being aware of them. Firms were discouraged by the delays in the extension of 
subsidies, the limited availability of funds and the complexity of the application 
procedure, with the last reason being particularly discouraging for small firms 
(Ministero dell’Industria and Mediocredito Centrale, 1994).       
 
The younger age of companies in the pre-subsidy stage is supported by previous 
research. Using interviews and questionnaires, this demonstrated that out of 124 
enterprises located in the South only 34 received subsidies in the start-up stage, 
whereas nearly all were subsidised during their trading life (Del Monte, 1984). The 
difficulty of securing subsidies in the early stage has been explained by the 
involvement of the credit institutions, which are much more cautious in extending D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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loans to new businesses rather than to companies with a proven track record (Del 
Monte and Luzenberger, 1989).  
 
'Never subsidised' companies are the smallest group within the Southern sample and 
in both samples, they are the group with the highest rate of failures, thus suggesting 
that subsidies may have reduced the probability of failure. 
 
As shown in section I, the direct aim of national and regional subsidies was to 
promote firms’ investment activity. Therefore, the Bagella and Caggese methodology 
has been adopted to assess whether subsidies were effective in this respect. Table 12 
displays the results. 
  
Table 12 around here 
 
Table 12 shows that Southern companies reach the highest level of investment when 
they are subsidised, particularly when looking at investment in absolute terms. The 
investment activity declines sharply in the post-subsidy period.  This can be due either 
to the high level of fixed assets previously reached, which would reduce the scope for 
further profitable investment, or else to the sharp decline of the companies’ 
profitability (see table 14) and increasing financial constraints (table 18). North-
Eastern companies behave in the ‘ideal’ way, as their investment activity increases in 
the post-subsidy period. 
 
In a graph similar to graph 1 above, with investment instead of profits on the X axis, 
both Southern and North-Eastern companies move from position 1 to position 2 when D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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they receive subsidies. However, when Southern companies are no longer subsidised 
they return to position 1, whereas North-Eastern companies would move further to the 
right towards the ‘competitive firm’ position. This implies that in order to promote the 
investment activity of Southern firms these should be subsidised constantly, which in 
turn indicates the ‘dependence’ of recipient firms on subsidies and a permanent 
capture of government funds.       
 
In order to investigate whether there is an association between increases in subsidies 
and increases in investment, the coefficient of correlation between these two variables 
has been calculated. These calculations rely on a limited number of observations, 
particularly for grants and fiscal subsidies in the North-Eastern sample, which were 
much less frequent in the San Mauro sample than in the Barletta sample. 
 
Table 13 around here 
 
The results indicate clearly that there is a positive correlation between subsidies and 
investment. The strength of the correlation varies with the types of subsidy, but can be 
considered satisfactorily strong, particularly when taking into account that these 
coefficients of correlation focus on one specific type of long-term capital, whereas a 
multiplicity of factors influence the investment decision of the firms.  
 
The lower coefficient presented by subsidised loans can be attributed to the difficulty 
of pointing out the exact time lag between the receipt of such subsidies and 
investment or vice versa. The Cassa  was legally permitted to undertake financial 
commitment in excess to its current financial means, which entailed the possibility D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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that firms would receive the secured grant or subsidised loan after undertaking the 
investment. The Barletta sample displays positive coefficients between implicit 
subsidies and investment when lagging both investment and subsidies (with values 
between 0.15 and 0.21), indicating that companies undertook investment both before 
and after receiving the subsidy. Therefore, any type of time lag will capture only part 
of the investment.  
 
The explanation of the low coefficient displayed by the North-Eastern samples lies in 
two observations, the exclusion of which would change the coefficient to 0.88, 
keeping the same time lag. In both cases, considerable investment was undertaken in 
the same year in which the subsidised loan was received, and therefore the correlation 
between subsidies and investment in these two cases is not captured by lagging 
subsidies by one year. 
 
Table 14 around here 
 
Table 14 presents two measures of profitability: return on equity and return on long-
term capital. Southern companies shift from low profitability and high risk before 
subsidies to higher profitability and similar risk when subsidised. In the post-subsidy 
stage they become much less profitable and less risky, therefore they do not remain in 
position 2. Return on equities and return on long-term capital reach negative values in 
the post-subsidy stage, for two out of the six companies are in the process of failing 
and are consistently making losses.  
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North-Eastern companies display the ‘ideal’ behaviour, as far as their profitability is 
concerned. They move from position 1 before subsidies to position 2 when subsidised, 
and in the post-subsidy stage they move closer to the ‘competitive firm’ position.  
Companies never subsidised in both samples seem to opt for a high-profit and high-
risk strategy, which entails a higher probability of failures, as shown in table 10. 
 
Southern companies with access to subsidies seem to pursue a ‘survival’ strategy, 
whereas unsubsidised ones pursue a ‘profit maximising’ strategy, or in the words of 
the sociological literature subsidised entrepreneurs prefer to reap benefits from 
institutions and abandon the economic rationale (Trigiglia, 1992). However, this 
might not be the case and Southern subsidised firms might also be pursuing an 
economic rationale. 
 
Tables 8 and 9 indicated the different conditions in which companies in the two ID 
samples cease their activity. Southern firms fold after a long period of losses and 
when they are financially distressed, while North-Eastern firms close down as soon as 
their turnover and profits are decreasing and their level of capitalisation (in term of 
finance) is very high. This indicates that the priority of Southern firms is to continue 
trading, whereas the priority of the North-Eastern firms is making profits. Moreover, 
the low capitalisation of Southern companies, particularly the scarcity of company-
owned capital (see indicator E/FNA in tables 8 and 9)  suggests that Southern 
companies would have very little capital, if any, to cover possible losses, which is not 
the case for their North-Eastern counterparts. 
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With the obvious historical differences, the low-profit low-risk strategy of Southern 
subsidised firms can be compared to the behaviour of medieval English peasants as 
explained by McCloskey (1976). Before the enclosures (consolidated holdings) of the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, farmers opted for scattered plots, despite the 
fact that the former provided them with a higher average income. McCloskey explains 
that this happened because the farmers’ priority was avoiding disaster, where disaster 
means falling below the subsistence level. Scattered plots produced a lower but less 
variable income than consolidated land, therefore by choosing the former peasants 
reduced their chances of incurring disaster. 
 
The scenario in which companies in the two ID samples operate, as far profitability is 
concerned, is represented in the following graph, where net profit is defined as total 
revenues minus total costs. 
 
Graph 2 around here  
 
In this case the disaster is the failure of the firm and the decision rule is minimising 
the probability of failure. If the failure threat were in position F1 neither high-profit 
high-risk (I2) nor low-profit low-risk (I1) investment endanger the company, therefore 
an economically rational company would chose I2. If the failure threat were in 
position F2, it would choose I1, as this would minimise its possibility of failure. If the 
failure threat were in position F3 the company has no choice: it needs high profits to 
continue trading, and has to undertake I2.    
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Therefore, if F1 represents the failure threat for North-Eastern companies and F3 for 
Southern companies, both groups should choose I2: North-eastern companies to 
maximise their profits, and Southern companies to survive. However, there is another 
element to be taken into account, namely subsidies.  The following graph shows what 
happens when subsidies are introduced in this scenario.   
 
Graph 3 around here 
 
Subsidies decrease the cost of the investment and therefore increase the net profit, 
moving it from P1 to P1s. Similarly, subsidies move P2 to P2s but I2s entails a higher 
probability of falling behind F3, therefore the subsidised company will choose I1s.   
 
However, in the long term, choosing I1s is economically rational only if the scenario 
in graph 3 is permanent - after all, English peasants chose scattered plots for centuries 
- meaning if there is the possibility of receiving subsidies frequently. If a company 
knew that after its current subsidy ended it had to undertake a high-risk high-profit 
investment to survive, it would perceive that undertaking this investment while still 
being subsidised would reduce the risk of such investment. In graph 3, the area behind 
F3 in the case of I2s is smaller than in the case of I2. In this case, the company would 
reap higher profits, which would make its financial situation sounder (for instance 
increasing its reserves and thus increasing its credit worthiness) and therefore push its 
own F3 to the left. Moreover, Southern subsidised companies will keep undertaking I1s 
because frequent subsidies increase the potential loss that partners would face in case 
of the company failure, as it would mean losing the company income plus frequent D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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and considerable subsidies. In other words, the access to frequent subsidies increases 
the opportunity cost of a company's failure. 
  
Therefore, the different levels of the failure threat and the frequency of the subsidies 
can explain the differences in the behaviour of companies in the two ID samples. 
Companies in the North-Eastern sample have a failure threat level so low (see for 
instance their level of overcapitalisation in terms of finance in tables 9 and 15) that 
whether non-subsidised or subsidised they choose a high-profit and high-risk 
investment. Companies in the Southern ID sample, having a higher level of failure 
threat (see for instance their financial capitalisation) choose a high-profit and high-
risk strategy if that is the only possibility to survive, i.e. if they belong to the 
unsubsidised group. 
 
Table 15 around here 
 
Considering the sharp decrease in the profitability of Southern companies in the post-
subsidy stage (table 14), it is not surprising that these companies return to a situation 
of financial constraint, both in the long and short term. In contrast, North-Eastern 
companies, the profitability of which increases further in the post-subsidy stage, 
become even less financially constrained (Bagella and Caggese, 1995). Low profits 
do not allow Southern companies, whether in the subsidised or in the post-subsidy 
stage, to build high levels of reserves and their financial under-capitalisation does not 
make these companies creditworthy. The situation is exacerbated in the case of 'post-
subsidy' companies, by the lack of subsidies themselves and their crowding-in effect 






V. 1    Risk and the effectiveness of subsidies 
 
The analysis conducted in this paper pointed out that although subsidies represented a 
smaller source of finance for North-Eastern companies, they were more effective than 
for Southern firms. North-Eastern companies not only invest more and are more 
profitable during their subsidised period than in the pre-subsidy period, but also their 
investment activity and profitability increase in their post-subsidy period. Moreover, 
they become increasingly less risky through the various stages. Therefore, the lower 
profitability of non-subsidised companies in the North-Eastern sample (table 9), 
which would suggest the failure of the subsidies, conceals their real effectiveness.  
The misleading results of the North-Eastern sample in table 9 are therefore due to the 
aggregation of pre-subsidy, post-subsidy and ‘never subsidised’ firms in the non-
subsidised group, among which the post-subsidy group presents the highest return and 
lowest risk. 
 
The higher rates of return displayed by subsidised companies in the Barletta sample 
(table 8) conceal the limited effectiveness of the regional subsidies. Southern 
companies’ investment activity and profitability increase during the subsidy stage, but 
profitability in particular fell when they were no longer subsidised. Moreover, it is 
clear that subsidised and post-subsidy companies opt for low-profit and low-risk 
investment, as opposed to the high-profit and high-risk strategy followed by ‘never 
subsidised’ companies. The interpretation put forward in this paper singles out three D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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factors that determined such an outcome: the riskier economic environment in which 
Southern firms operate, and the amount and frequency of subsidies. Under these 
conditions, the choice of a low-profit and low-risk strategy of Southern firms in the 
sample becomes the most rational. Therefore, the analysis does not support the 
sociological interpretation according to which Southern entrepreneurs abandon the 
economic rationale and reap benefits from institutions and/or the political 
environment. Southern entrepreneurs in the sample indeed benefit from institutions 
but the rationale remains purely economic.   
 
V.2   Wider implications 
 
The policy for the South has been criticised on several accounts. In particular, 
subsidised credit and capital grants have been criticized as affected by an inefficient 
bureaucracy, in turn affected by bribery; it is also claimed that financial subsidies did 
not always translate into productive investment but may have been used to fuel 
liquidity or undertake financial speculation. Various works stress that large 
investments in capital-intensive sectors were the main beneficiary of subsidies and 
that since the lifting of the size limit of eligible companies, in 1962, the system of 
subsidies in the South was diverted from its original purpose of developing an organic 
network of small and medium-sized firms. Conversely, subsidies did not favour the 
development of small local firms and the industrial policy for the South has failed to 
promote a self-sustaining industrial development similar to that which took place in 
the North-East. However, a study by Faini (1985), based on subsidies extended by the 
Cassa by company size between 1970 and 1983, found no evidence of small firms 




The analysis of the two ID samples supports only part of the criticisms mentioned 
above. Consistently with the Faini study, the large number of subsidised companies in 
the Southern sample (26 out of 32, the corresponding figure for the North-Eastern 
sample being 11 out of 21) does not indicate that small firms were at a disadvantage 
in accessing subsidies. As for the way Southern companies used subsidies, both the 
Bagella and Caggese method and the coefficients of correlation indicate an 
association between subsidies and investment. Moreover, subsidies were extremely 
important for the capitalisation (in financial terms) of such firms. Only when 
companies in the Southern sample were subsidised did they cover their fixed assets 
with long-term capital. Therefore, it seems unlikely that companies in the Southern 
sample were using subsidies for purposes other than financing investment.  
 
However, some of the criticisms are confirmed by the analysis of the two samples. 
The deterioration of the economic performance of Southern firms in the post-subsidy 
stage sharply contrasts with the improved performance of the North-Eastern 
counterparts. This clearly indicates the dependence of companies in the Southern 
sample on subsidies, whereas the North-Eastern firms show autonomy from subsidies, 
as their performance improves even in the absence of subsidies. Therefore, although 
Southern firms in the sample indicate an association between subsidies and 
investment, the growth promoted by subsidies cannot be considered ‘self-sustaining' 
as in the North-East.       
 
Yet another point on which the effectiveness of a policy can be tested is whether it 
can be an effective mechanism for correcting capital market failures. Echoing the D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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Gerschenkronian argument, the World Bank stresses that government credit can be an 
effective mechanism for correcting capital market failures in less developed regions 
where the capital shortage renders private banking unviable (Calomiris and 
Himmelberg, 1994). However, even in developed and industrialised regions, 
government credit can correct capital market imperfections, such as those due to 
asymmetric information, by assuming the cost of monitoring and providing a senior 
status to private credit. In this respect North-Eastern subsidies also seem to be more 
effective. Subsidised companies in both samples display a higher percentage of long-
term market borrowed funds as compared to non-subsidised companies, and therefore 
subsidies seem to have a crowding-in effect. However, while companies in the 
Southern sample return to a situation of financial constraints in the post-subsidy stage, 
similar to financial constraints already experienced in the pre-subsidy stage, North-
Eastern companies enjoy higher levels of liquidity in their post-subsidy stage. This 
result is not surprising considering that the profitability of companies in the Southern 
sample decreases in the post-subsidy stage whereas it increases in the North-Eastern 
sample. 
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Appendix A:  The regions of Italy 
Figure 1 here 
 
 
Appendix B: List of companies and records available 
 
Companies are designated with three letters, of which the first refers to the area 
(North or South), while the following two are the initials of the company’s name. The 
first date corresponds to the year of establishment, the following dates to the period 
for which records are available. When dates of establishment or change of public 
status specify the month, it means that the relevant record (i.e. deed of incorporation 
or the official document recording the change in the company’s legal status) was 
available in the company’s folder. When the month it is not specified it means that the 
relevant record was not available, but the year was mentioned in one of the reports 
available. 
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Records at the Chamber of Commerce in Bari          
Folder No  Company  Legal status  Established  Records available  Product 
       From  To   
826  San  Pb/Ltd (1988) 1936  1951  1991  Food processing 
1,786 Sma  Pb  1959 1959  1976  Clothing 
2,140 Svr  Ltd  1967 1967  1991  Food  processing 
2,191 Sin  Ltd  1967 1968  1989  Food  processing 
2,169 Ser  Ltd  1/1967  1969  1985  Wood  processing
2,442 Sfi  Ltd  1/1971  1971  1991 Textiles 
2,564 Sbc  Ltd  1/1972  1972  1991  Textiles 
3,603 Stu  Pv/Ltd 
(12/1977) 
3/1972 1978  1991  Wood  processing
2,635  Svc  Ltd  11/ 1972  1973  1991  Food processing 
2,614 Sfs  Ltd  11/1972  1973  1985 Textiles 
2,674  Sab  Ltd /Pv (1986) 2/1973  1973  1986  Footwear 
2,690 San  Ltd  3/1973  1973  1983 Clothing 
2,645 Sbia  Pb  1973 1973  1991  Clothing 
2,632 Sal  Ltd  1973 1973  1979 Clothing 
2,586 Sar  Ltd  1973 1973  1988 Footwear 
2,749 Sri  Pb  10/  1973  1974  1991 Footwear 
2,769 Sst  Pb  11/  1973  1974  1990  Plastic 
2,788 Spl  Pv/Ltd 
(4/1984) 
12/1973 1984  1991  Footwear 
2,840 Sca  Ltd  3/1974  1974  1987 Footwear 
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3,094 Smo  Ltd  11/1975  1976  1981  Clothing 
3,400 Sga  Ltd  3/1977  1979  1991 Footwear 
3,479 Sto  Ltd  10/  1977  1978  1991 Footwear 
3,546 Sbim  Ltd  11/1977  1978  1991  Clothing 
3,593 Ste  Ltd  12/1977  1978  1991 Footwear 
4,165 Sec  Ltd  1/1980  1980  1991 Footwear 
4,427 Sja  Ltd  9/1980  1980  1991 Clothing 
4,790 Sli  Ltd  6/1981  1981  1991 Footwear 
4,110 Spo  Pv/Ltd  (1983) 1979 1983  1988 Footwear 
5,491 Sro  Ltd  1983 1983  1991 Footwear 
5,475 Ssa  Ltd  2/1983  1983  1991 Footwear 
4,600 Sco  Pv/Ltd 
(6/1984) 
3/1981 1984  1991  Footwear 
Keys: Pv= Private partnership; Ltd = Limited liabilities; Pb= Public share. 
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Records at the Chamber of Commerce in Forlì 
Folder n.  Company  Legal status  Established Records available  Product 
       from  to   
2,996  Nla   Ltd/Pv (1966-71)  1955  1956  1991*  Footwear 
3,751 Nde  Pb  1962  1963 1967 Footwear 
4,442  Nci  Pv/Ltd  (10/1974)  7/1968  1974  1991  Metal chairs 
5,676 Neu  Ltd  3/1974  1974 1991 Footwear 
equipment 
5,212 Nrs  Pv/Pb  (12/1975)  4/1967  1976 1991 Footwear 
5,581 Nwi  Ltd  12/1973 1974 1979 Footwear 
7,280 Nma  Ltd  2/1978  1978 1987 Footwear 
8,146 Nal  Pb  9/1979  1979 1991 Clothing 
8,367  Nca  Pv/Pb (2/ 1980)  9/1966  1981  1991  Footwear 
4,935 Npo  Pv/Pb  (12/1980)  2/1972  1981 1991 Footwear 
3,484  Nfa  Pv/Pb (4/ 1981)  1/1961  1981  1991  Footwear 
4,662  Nfr  Pv/Pb (6/ 1982)  2/1970  1982  1991  Clothing 
10,471 Nri  Ltd  6/1982  1982  1991  Footwear 
10,417 Nrf  Ltd  5/1982  1982  1991  Leather  items 
4,351 Nvi  Pv/Ltd  (11/1982)  8/1967  1983 1985 Footwear 
6,934 Nrm  Pv/Ltd  (2/1983)  6/1969  1983 1987 Clothing 
11,850 Npn  Ltd  4/1984  1984  1991  Footwear 
5,325 Nrt  Pv/Ltd  (9/1985)  4/1973  1985 1991 Paper/card 
boxes 
12,904 Nti  Ltd  4/1985  1985  1991  Footwear 
11,263 Nip  Pv/Ltd  (5/1989) 9/1983  1989  1991  Packaging D:\Documents and Settings\les04rl\Local Settings\Temporary Internet 
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13,580 Npl  Pv/Ltd  (7/1989) 12/1985  1989  1991  Leather  items 
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